A leading international expert on European Law, Dr Carl Baudenbacher, gave a lecture on Iceland and the EU in the Independence Hall at the Eastern Square (Austurvöllur) in Reykjavík on Monday 10 August 2026. The lecture was organised by the Icelandic Research Centre for Politics and Economics at the University of Iceland, RNH and RSE, the Social and Economic Research Centre, and was sponsored by the movement Áfram Ísland and the Public Book Club which published a book by Dr Baudenbacher and his daughter, Dr Laura M Baudenbacher, also an expert on European Law, Iceland Before the EU Referendum. The meeting was chaired by Dr Ólafur Ragnar Grímsson, former Professor of Politics at the University of Iceland and President of Iceland in 1996–2016. The University’s festivities hall had originally been booked for the event, as Dr Baudenbacher has given lectures there and been a visiting professor in European Law at the University. But the rector of the University, Silja Bára Ómarsdóttir, cancelled the booking, giving the reason that the movement Áfram Ísland had (with the Public Book Club) advertised the event.
Baudenbacher said that the referendum on 29 August was not about Europe or isolation, because Iceland was already deeply integrated into Europe through her membership in the European Economic Area, EEA, and in the European Free Trade Association, EFTA. The referendum was whether to continue in the EEA or join the European Union, the EU. Baudenbacher argued that Iceland would have negligible influence in the EU, relatively much less than in the EEA. The EU was confronted by many difficulties, not least in Germany. As an EU member state, Iceland would have to transfer control of her fisheries, agriculture, foreign trade, and monetary affairs to Brussels, whereas these sectors were exempted from the EEA agreement. At present, the EFTA Court decided on cases, but if Iceland joined the EU, judicial power would be transferred to the Court of Justice of the European Union which was known for its tendency to support the European Commission. It was not a plausible argument that Iceland had to join the EU for security reasons. She already had a defence treaty with the United States, and changes in long-term foreign policy were not made on the basis of comments by a US President whose bark was worse than his bite.
Baudenbacher said that if the voters approved of resuming the accession negotiations in the referendum, then there was a danger that the Icelanders would be entrapped in such negotiations which were essentially negotiations about the adjustment of Iceland to the EU legal framework. While formally nothing barred Iceland from rejecting membership, it might be difficult to return to the situation of 2026. A membership application meant not only that a state wanted a discussion, but also that it wanted to join the EU. A Yes in the referendum meant a big step towards membership, not only an exploration of the terms offered.
Baudenbacher recalled the Icesave dispute between the Icelanders on the one hand and the British and the Dutch on the other. It began when the British and the Dutch government unilaterally decided, in the midst of the 2008 Icelandic bank collapse, to compensate deposits in Landsbanki’s Icesave accounts and then demanded that the Icelandic state guaranteed the reimbursement of their outlays, roughly four billion euros, with interest. The Icelandic state rejected this demand as it was the Landsbanki’s estate and the Icelandic Depositors’ Guarentee Fund that were liable for the accounts, and as the Icelandic state had fulfilled all its obligations under European law on financial markets. After the Icelandic voters had twice rejected deals where the liability of the Icelandic state was accepted, if the assets of Landsbanki could not cover its liabilities to depositors, the dispute was referred to the EFTA Court where Baudenbacher presided. The European Commission joined Great Britain and the Netherlands in the case. The EFTA Court rejected a liability of the Icelandic state in the case, as there was no statute to be found that it was financially liable, and as the current European legislation was about bank failures, but not the collapse of a whole banking system.
The meeting hall was packed, and after Baudenbacher’s lecture he got a standing ovation. It was followed by a lively discussion. The chair, Ólafur Ragnar Grímsson, quipped that Baudenbacher was probably the only person alive who could prompt the three ex-ministers Jón Baldvin Hannibalsson from the Social Democrats, Gudni Ágústsson from the Agrarians, and Gudlaugur Thór Thórdarson from the Independence Party to attend the same meeting. In one of his responses Baudenbacher pointed out that Brexit had been a great loss for the EU, because the British has developed a strong legal tradition different from that of the continent, especially in France. He quoted the Czech foreign minister Karel Schwarzenbeg who had not wanted a Europe controlled by French dirigisme combined with German thoroughness. Baudenbacher added that Schwarzenberg’s forefather, Karl Philipp, Prince Schwarzenberg, had led the army which defeated Napoleon at Leipzig in October 1813, Napoleon being one of the many despots who had tried to unify Europe.








